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JURISDICTION
This appeal

..- from

=3 Judgment

Circ

writer «.?d in

epartment, on Octobei

.990.

The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant tc Jtan
Code Ann. 78-2a-3(2)(d).
ISSUES PRESENTED
a.

Do the trial court's Findings of Fact support the

conclusion that there was
b.

I

< :.ria,

leration?

.. art - s Findings or M e t

support the

conclusion that Bruce Bell was not entitled to reject

the

contract?
c.

Do the trial court's Findings of Fact support the

conclusion that there was no mutual mistake <

which

made the contract voidable?
STANDARD OF REVIEW AS TO EACH ISSUE
Inasmuch

•.: the appellant apparently floes not

the Findings o

*

dispute

t he trial court, the appellee

agrees that the issues raised are questions of law and are
reviewable under the standards set forth in Scharf v. BMG
Corp ^,

700

P. ?\\

1 i)ui\.

I \\ 1 o

(Utah,

1985)

and

Stewart

Coffman, 748 P.2d 579 (Utah App. 1988).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
The appea.

^

case is determined -

believe that a resolution of this
reference to the Utah Constitution or

to other statutes. Rather, appellee believes that the common

v.

3
law

as

it relates

to

contracts,

as

argued

below,

is

determinative.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature and History of the Case,
Outdoor Systems, Inc. ("Outdoor") generally agrees with
the statement of the nature and history of the case given by
Bruce Bell and Associates, Inc. ("Bell").

Outdoor disagrees

with the statement made by Bell that "there is no dispute
that the billboard actually provided by Outdoor Systems was
not visible from the highway."
It is abundantly clear from the record that that point
was in dispute.

See, for example, Finding No. 32, wherein

the trial court found that Plaintiff's representative was
able to see the billboard although the graphics portion of
the billboard was not readily seen.

The trial court, in

fact, did not make a specific finding as to whether or not
the billboard was visible from the highway.
stated below,

For the reasons

such a finding was not necessciry

in the

present case.
As a matter of convenience and continuity, Outdoor will
refer to the record in the same manner as did Bell in its
appellant's brief.
specific

numerical

"Conclusions."

Each reference herein will be to a
paragraph

of

the

"Findings"

or

Where other references are made to the

record, Outdoor will refer to the trial transcript.

4
A copy of the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
and a copy of the Advertising Agreement and other portions
of the record cited in this brief are submitted herewith as
an addendum.

The Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

are found at record no. 56-65.

The Advertising Agreement is

found at Record No. 117, Exhibit No. D3C.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Although generally accurate, Bell's Statement of Facts
is not accurate insofar as it strays from the trial court's
Findings of Fact.

As indicated above, the facts in this

case were not undisputed as claimed by Bell, but were, in
fact, the subject of dispute.
forth

only

those

The following recitation sets

disagreements

Outdoor

has with

Bell's

Statement of Facts.
1.

Contrary to Bell's assertion, the record does not

support the conclusion that "Brossart...had no reason to
believe that anyone else with expertise to
suitability of the board would see it."
p. 5.)

evaluate the

(Appellant's Brief,

Mr. Brossart's testimony was that Mr. Bell indicated

to Brossart that the sign had been approved and that he
would contract for the sign for a year.

Additionally, Mr.

Bell indicated that someone that he worked with in Nogales
or his client had ridden the board and had approved the
location.

(Trial Transcript, p. 13.)

The record indicates

that there was no discussion wherein Brossart was advised
that the sign location had been approved by someone having
no experience.

(Trial Transcript, pp. 48, 49.)

5
2.

Bell overstates the findings of the court insofar

as he has stated that "Brossart admitted at trial that the
location

of

the

billboard

made

it

impossible

for

the

advertisement to be read by passers-by on Interstate 19.
(Appellants Brief, p. 6.)
finding

of

the

trial

In fact, as indicated above, the

court was

that

the

testimony

of

Brossart was that the graphics were not readily seen but the
pictorial could be seen.

(Finding No. 32.)

The trial court

made no specific finding with regard to the visibility of
the billboard as a whole.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Bell was properly found liable to Outdoor under the
Advertising Agreement because:
1.

Bell approved the sign location prior to entering

into the contract;
2.

Bell was solely responsible for providing Outdoor

with the billboard design which Outdoor was required to
exactly reproduce on the approved sign location;
3.

Outdoor prepared

and maintained

the

billboard

pursuant to Bell's instructions; and,
4.

Bell failed to make payment.
ARGUMENT
I.

THERE WAS NOT A FAILURE OF CONSIDERATION,

Failure of consideration exists "wherever one who is
either given or promised to give some performance fails
without his fault to receive in some material respect the
agreed exchange for the performance."

Bentley v. Potter,

6
694 P.2d 617 (Utah, 1984).

The analysis followed in Copper

State Leasing Co. v. Blacker Appliance & Furniture Co., 770
P.2d 88 (Utah, 1988), with respect to the issue of failure
of consideration is a model for analysis applicable to this
case.
The

court

consideration

in

Copper

determined

for the contract was.

first

what

the

It found that the

consideration consisted of mutual promises; Blacker promised
to pay certain lease payments in exchange for Copper State's
promise to advance the purchase price of certain computers
prior to delivery.

The court

found that Copper State

furnished its promised consideration when it disbursed the
purchase price prior to delivery.
Blacker

argued

that

since

the

equipment

delivered there was a failure of consideration.
held otherwise.

was

not

The court

It stated:

There was not a failure of consideration in
this case barring enforcement of the
contract
or
excusing
performance
by
defendants, because
they
received
the
promised
performance, or consideration,
i.e., Copper State paid $84,000 to Cowboy
Computers. Xd. at 92.
The contract between Outdoor and Bell was reduced to
writing.

(Finding No. 14.)

The consideration

for the

contract included Outdoor's promise to paint and maintain an
outdoor painted bulletin for a period of twelve months in
exchange

for Bell's promise

therefore.
Contract

to make

specified

payments

Paragraph 3 of the Terms and Conditions of the
makes

clear

Outdoor's

obligation

under

the

7
contract.

It states:

"Outdoor agrees that all designs for

displays will be fully reproduced and that the displays will
be maintained in good condition."
The trial court found that Bell admitted "that there
were no defects in the reproduction of the display, that it
was prepared pursuant to the instruction of the defendant
and that the sign was maintained for the full tw€*lve month
contract."

(Finding No. 34.)

Since the trial court

specifically found that Outdoor provided the consideration
required under the contract, it properly found that there
was no failure of consideration.
Bell misapplies the law to the facts of this case by
assuming that a condition to Bell's liability was that the
advertising

had

to

be

expressly found otherwise.

"effective."

The

trial

court

It found and so held that "there

is nothing in the contract which requires the plaintiff to
meet this expectation of defendant.

Rather, the plaintiff's

contractual duty was to faithfully reproduce the sign from
the art work provided to it by Defendant."

(Conclusion No.

1; Trial Transcript pp. 116, 117.)
The cases cited by Bell do not support Bell's position.
As discussed above, the Copper State Leasing case supports
the trial court's decision.

Polyglycoat

Corporation v.

Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 (Utah, 1979), cited by Bell is not on
point; it applied the law of rescission where there was a
material breach of contract.

There is no finding of breach

of contract in the present case.

8
Nielsen v. MFT Leasing, 656 P.2d 454 (Utah, 1982) cited
by Bell is distinguishable from the facts of this case.

In

Nielsen, the Court found a failure of consideration where
"...MFT did not provide the equipment specified in the lease
contract."

Id. at 457.

In the present case, the trial

court specifically found that Outdoor provided precisely the
product requested of it, i.e. Outdoor faithfully reproduced
the billboard at the location accepted by Bell.
The trial court properly applied Utah law on failure of
consideration

by

identifying

the

consideration

for

the

contract and by making a factual determination of whether or
not that consideration was

furnished by Outdoor.

Upon

finding that the consideration was furnished by Outdoor, the
trial court properly found that there was no failure of
consideration.
II, THERE WAS NO MUTUAL MISTAKE.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that:
Evidence to sustain a mutual mistake of fact
must be clear, definite and convincing and
the party asserting it should be not guilty
of negligence in the execution of the
contract.
Ellison v. Johnson, 18 Utah 2d
374 at 377. 423 P. 2d 657 at 659 (Utah,
1967).
The trial court properly found that under the facts
Bell could

not maintain

(Conclusions Nos. 5, 6.)
court supporting
mistake include:

its defense

of mutual mistake.

Specific findings of the trial

its conclusions with respect to mutual

9
1.

Bell elected not to personally drive by the sign

location prior to entering into the contract but, rather,
made an economic decision to have its client do the driveby.

(Finding No. 11; Trial Transcript p. 112, 113.)
2.

Bell made conscious decisions with respect to the

art-work and directional language for the sign knowing that
the sign was to be a cross-reader (Findings Nos. 15, 16;
Trial Transcript p. 109.)
3.

The "effectiveness" of the sign was a prediction

made by Bell after the contract was entered into based upon
a

concept

for

the

billboard

created

solely

by

Bell.

(Findings Nos. 14, 15, 16; Trial Transcript pp. 14, 115.)
4.

Bell,

through

its

client,

approved

the

location prior to entering into the contract.

sign

(Findings

Nos. 10, 11, 12, 13; Trial Transcript pp. 14, 115.)
A.

There is no mutual mistake of fact because Bruce

Bell assumed the risk that the billboard may not be as
effective as desired by the defendant.
Contrary to Bell's assertion, (Appellant's Brief p. 18)
the principal of assumption of risk is applicable to the
defense of mutual mistake.

Utah Supreme Court so held in

the case Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688
(Utah, 1985).
asked

to

In Blackhurst, the Utah Supreme Court was

decide

whether

a

personal

injury

settlement

agreement should be rescinded where the injured party died
shortly after the settlement agreement was executed because
of a mutual mistake of fact, i.e., neither of the parties

knew that the injured party had pneumonia at the time of the
settlement agreement.

The court held that the settlement

agreement could not be rescinded on the basis of mutual
mistake because the parties had assumed the risk of the
injured parties condition.

It stated:

At the time of settlement, both parties
undertook a risk that the resolution of the
uncertainty might be unfavorable.
See
Restatement (Second) of Contracts 154(b)
(1981).
This Court will not nullify a
settlement contract because one of the
parties would have acted differently if all
the future outcomes would have been known at
the time of the agreement. Id. at 692.
Bell argues that the mutual mistake in this case was a
mistake in the assumption that "the Outdoor Systems board
could effectively carry an adequate advertising message,
without material limitation on the form or content of the
ad."

(Appellant's brief, p. 18, 19.)

This argument is not

supported by the record.
Bell

approved

the

sign

location

upon

its

economic

decision not to personally view the sign location, but
rather, to have its client drive by the location.
Nos. 10, 11, 12.)

(Findings

It therefore assumed any risk as to the

ability of the location to convey the message desired by
Bell.

Indeed, it seems clear that the location was capable

of conveying a message, the problem was that Bell decided
upon a pictorial design with relatively small graphics which
turned out not to be as effective as Bell desired.

In fact,

Mr. Bell admitted that had the design he submitted for the
billboard been different, it could have been seen to better

convey the message he desired.

(Trial transcript, p. 118.)

In light of these facts, the trial court correctly found
that Bell assumed the risk of whether or not the artwork he
supplied to Outdoor would be effective in conveying the
message intended by the billboard.
B.
mistake

There was no mutual mistake of fact because any
was

Bell's

prediction

of

the

billboard's

effectiveness.
This court has recognized that there can be no mutual
mistake of fact as to events which are to occur in the
future.

This court so held in Mooney v. G R & Associates,

746 P. 2d 1174 (Utah App. 1987).

In Mooney, the obligor

under Promissory Note sought to avoid his obligation on the
grounds of mutual mistake of material fact.

The mistake

argued was that the parties believed that the promissory
note would be secured by a security interest.
security interest was filed late.

In fact, the

This court stated the

rule as follows:
It is well settled that a contract is
voidable if there is a mutual mistake of
material facts...However, there can be no
mutual mistake as to an event which is to
occur in the future.
Id. at 1178. (cites
omitted.)
The court found that there no mutual mistake and stated:
The event which caused the alleged material
mistake of fact was the failure to record
the security interest, a fact which did not
exist at the time the parties entered into
the agreement, and which could not have been
known until some time after the documents
had been executed. While this is a failure
of expectation, it is not a mutual mistake
of material fact. Id. at 1178.
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In the present case, the artwork was not submitted by
Bell to Outdoor until after the contract was entered into
(Finding No. 14; Trial Transcript pp. 14, 15.)

The failure

of the billboard to convey the message intended by Bell as
effectively as Bell desired was an event or prediction which
could not have been known until after the contract had been
executed.
material

Accordingly, the doctrine of mutual mistake of
fact

has

no

application

to

this

case.

The

distinction becomes quite clear when comparing the facts of
this

case with

the

facts of Robert

Lanqston,

LTD. v.

McOuarrie, 741 P.2d 554 (Utah App. 1987).
In Lanqston, the court found a mutual mistake of fact
sufficient to rescind a sales agreement where it found that
at the time of the contract, both of the parties to the
contract were mistaken as to the number of cattle existing
in a ranching operation which was the subject of a buy-sell
agreement.

Since both parties assumed

that there were

cattle on the property which, as it turned out, were not
there, the court rescinded the contract.
In the present case, there was no mistake about where
the sign was to be located; the board was in existence.
location

was

specifically

(Finding No. 13.)

approved

by

the

The

defendant.

Therefore, the trial court properly found

that Bell did not prove a mutual mistake of fact.

The

record is clear on the point that any mistake was solely a
result of Bell's misjudgment.

Mr. Bruce Bell's testimony on

cross examination in this regard is most revealing.
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Mr. Van Dyke:

Well, let's suppose that rather them
having a pictorial we had lettering,
the full height and width of the
board. Could that be seen?

Bell:

I would suggest it could.

Mr. Van Dyke:

So it could convey a message.
The
problem we've got is that it couldn't
convey a message with the artwork you
provided, is that right?

Bell:

That seems to be the case.

(Trial

Transcript, p. 118.)
C.

There was no mutual mistake of fact because the

"mistake of fact" referred to by Bell consists of Bell's
misunderstanding of the legal effect of the contract.
The Utah Supreme Court has held that a misunderstanding
of the legal effect of the contract does not provide a basis
for rescission of the contract.

This was the holding of the

court in the Kiahtipes v. Mills, 649 P.2d 9 (Utah 1982).
In Kiahtipesf the Utah Supreme Court held that a buyer
under an agreement to sell real estate was entitled to
specific performance.

In that case, the seller argued that

the parties misunderstood the effect of a mortgage upon the
sales

agreement.

The

court

held

that

such

a

misunderstanding did not provide a basis for the rescission
of the contract under the doctrine of mutual mistake.
stated:
The "mistake of fact" referred to by the
court appears to consist of defendant's
alleged mis-perception of the effect of the
HSB mortgage upon their sales agreement.
However, such a mistake, if it existed,
would have been neither mutual nor a mistake
of fact.
It is clear that even if
defendants themselves misunderstood
the
legal
effect
of
the
contract,
this

It

misunderstanding
was
not
shared
by
plaintiffs and hence was not mutual...[T]he
mistake doctrine applies only to mistakes
concerning existing fact and not to errors
in the legal interpretation of a document.
Id. at 13.
In the present case, the contract makes clear Outdoor's
obligation.

It was to "faithfully

prepared by Bell."

reproduce a display

The contract does not make Outdoor the

guarantor of the effectiveness of the display.
Bell had substantial previous experience in outdoor
advertising.

(Finding No. 4.)

It solely was responsible,

under the contract at issue, for the preparation of the
design to be reproduced upon the billboard.

If there was a

mistake, the mistake was Bell,s in preparing a design which
would not adequately convey the message intended by Bell.
There was no mistake made by Outdoor.

It faithfully

reproduced Bell's design and placed the billboard at the
location approved.

In light of these facts, the trial court

properly held that the contract could not be voided under
the doctrine of mutual mistake.
III.

BELL DID NOT HAVE RIGHT TO REPUDIATE THE CONTRACT

In order for Bell to establish its right to repudiate
the

contract

at

issue,

Bell

must

prove

committed a material breach of contract.

that

Outdoor

As was stated the

court in Polyglycoat Corp. v. Holcomb, 591 P.2d 449 (Utah,
1979) :
What constitutes so serious a breach as to
justify rescission is not easily reduced to
precise statement, but certainly a failure
of performance which "defeats the very
object of the contract" or "[is] of such

prime importance that the contract would not
have been made if default in that particular
had been contemplated"
is a materictl
failure. Id. at 451.
Bell's argument in support of the assertion that it was
entitled to repudiate the contract (Appellant's Brief p. 15)
flies

in

the

specifically

face

found

of
that

the

facts.

there

were

The
no

trial

defects

court
in

the

reproduction in the display, that it was prepared pursuant
to the instruction of the defendant and was maintained for
the full twelve month contract.

Since Bell agrees with the

findings of fact, there can be no question but what Outdoor
was not in breach of contract.

Since Outdoor did not breach

the contract, Bell could not repudiate the contract.
Bell

appears

Advertising

to

Agreement

argue
gave

that
Bell

paragraph
an

10

unlimited

of

the

right

to

repudiate the contract if it found that the advertising was
not "effective."
well-established

Such an argument is inconsistent with
contract

law.

In

the

case

Resource

Management Co. v. Weston Ranch. 706 P. 2d 1028 (Utah, 1985),
the Utah

Supreme Court restated a number of principals

applicable

to

this

case

contracts.

They include:

which

are

basic

in

analyzing

1.
...court's
endeavor
to
construe
contracts so as not to grant one of the
parties an absolute and arbitrary right to
terminate a contract. Id. at 1037.
2. When there exists only the facade of a
promise, i.e., statement made in such vague
or conditional terms that the person making
it commits himself to nothing that is
ascertainable, the alleged "promise" is said
to be "illusory."
An illusory promise

16
neither binds the person making it...nor
functions
as
consideration
for
return
promise. Id. at 1036 (cites omitted).
Under Bell's construction of the contract, Bell would
have the court

find that the billboard

must have been

"effective" and since, in Bell'S opinion, the sign was not
"effective," Bell had the right to repudiate the contract
under paragraph 10 of the contract.

Such a reading of the

contract would give Bell an arbitrary right of repudiation
and would, therefore, render Bell's consideration illusory.
Utah law expressly denies such a construction in this case.
Accordingly, the trial court properly held that paragraph 10
of the Advertising Agreement did not provide a basis for
repudiation in this case.
CONCLUSION
The trial court properly found that Bell was liable to
Outdoor under the terms of the Advertising Agreement.

It

rejected Bell's attempt to impose conditions and warranties
upon Outdoor which were not incorporated in the contract.
The trial court's conclusion of law conforms to well settled
law.

Accordingly, Outdoor requests that this court affirm

the judgment against Bell.
DATED this ^ 7 ^ d a v of February, 1991.
ELGGREN & VAN DYKE

PAUL H. VAN DYKE
Paul H. Van Dyke
Attorney for Plaintiff
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ADDENDUM

VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY
E r i c C. O l s o n ( 4 1 0 8 )
Attorneys for Defendant
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah
84145
Telephone:
(801) 532-3333

CIRCUIT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
OUTDOOR SYSTEMS, INC.,

)
)
)
)

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
C O N C I S I O N S OF LAW

)

Civil No. 893006965CV

BRUCE BELL & ASSOCIATES,
INC. , a Utah Corporation,

)
)

Honorable Judge Watson

Defendant.

;
)

Plaintiff,
vs.

Trial of the above-referenced matter was heard before
the bench on August 7, 1990, before the Honorable Edward A.
Watson.

Paul H. Van Dyke of Elggren & Van Dyke appeared on

behalf of the Plaintiff.

Eric C. Olson of Van Cott, Bagley,

Cornwall & McCarthy appeared on behalf of the defendant.
Witnesses were sworn and evidence was taken on behalf of both
Plaintiff and Defendant.

The Court, having now considered all

the evidence and the arguments of the counsel and for good cause
therefore appearing, hereby enters it:

FINDINGS QF TM2
1.

The plaintiff is an outdoor advertising company,

in the business of providing outdoor advertising space and
preparing signs for its various clients.
2.

The defendant is an advertising firm based in

Salt Lake City.
3.

At all times relevant, both Plaintiff and

Defendant were represented in all matters relevant to this case
by individuals having substantial experience in outdoor
advertising.
4.

The defendant Bruce Bell & Associates had, prior

to the contract at issue with the Plaintiff, previously rendered
services for its client, Kino Springs.
5.

The defendant had earlier prepared a magazine

advertisement for Kino Springs and decided that a follow-up
billboard advertisement should be put in place.

The billboard

was to follow the concept of the magazine advertisement in that
is (sic) should be a pictorial and should be dignified.
6.

In late October, 1988, Kino Springs directed the

defendant to prepare a design for and obtain a space for
displaying an outdoor sign in Arizona located on 1-19 south of
Amado.
7.

In connection with the directions from Kino

Springs, the defendant, by and through Bruce Bell, called
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Plaintiff's

representative,

Steve B r o s s a r t ,

and enquired of the

a v a i l a b i l i t y of a d v e r t i s i n g space.
8.

At t h e time of the c a l l , t h e p l a i n t i f f was

completing a new s i g n i n t h e are of i n t e r e s t t o Kino Springs.
I t was the only s i g n a v a i l a b l e i n the area.
9.

Steve B r o s s a r t sent a packet of i n f o r m a t i o n t o

the defendant as a follow-up t o the c o n v e r s a t i o n which packet
was e n t e r e d i n t o evidence as Exhibits
"D-3c" c o n s i s t i n g ,

M

D-3", "D-3a",

M

D-3b" and

among o t h e r t h i n g s , of photographs of the

s i g n taken by Steve B r o s s a r t .
10.

The defendant contacted Kino Springs and

r e q u e s t e d t h a t i t send a r e p r e s e n t a t i v e t o d r i v e by t h e s i g n
l o c a t i o n and approve i t .
11.

This was accomplished.

The defendant o r d i n a r i l y would have had one of

i t s own employees d r i v e - b y and approve the s i g n l o c a t i o n but did
not do so i n t h i s i n s t a n c e because the l o c a t i o n was out-ofstate.

The s i g n was l o c a t e d eight miles south of Green Valley,

Arizona.

According,

i t made an economic d e c i s i o n t o have i t s

c l i e n t do t h e d r i v e - b y .
12.

An employee of Kino Springs approved the s i g n

13.

Steve B r o s s a r t c a l l e d Bruce Bell

location.

thereafter.

shortly

Mr. Bell i n d i c a t e d t h a t the l o c a t i o n was approved
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and said that he would sign the contract earlier submitted for a
one year term.
14.
plaintiff.

The signed contract was faxed back to the

Art work for the design of the sign was to follow.
15.

Bruce Bell and the defendant created a concept

for the outdoor advertising following the concept used earlier
in a magazine advertisement, which included:
a.

A picture which was to realistically depict

Kino Springs;
Copy work necessary for the sign;
Art work prepared by an outside contractor;
and,
d.
16.

Directional language for the sign.

The above decisions made by Mr. Bell with respect

to the sign design were consciously made knowing that the sign
was to be cross-reader.
17.

The outside artist prepared a mock-up of the sign

which was intended to be proportionate to the finished sign.
18.

A copy of the artwork and mock-up for the

billboard were sent to Kino Springs by the defendant for
approval.

They were approved and later sent by the defendant to

the plaintiff for reproduction in the creation of the billboard.
19.

The artwork which was submitted by the defendant

to Plaintiff had various overlays to show color, graphics,
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proportion and, in general, all detail to be included in the
sign.
20.

Upon receiving the artwork, Steve Brossart,

representing the plaintiff, expressed concerns to Mr. Bell
concerning the readability of the graphics.

In particular, Mr.

Brossart was concerned that the graphics were too small to be
read from the .ughv&y and recommended to Mr. Bell that the size
of the graphics be increased or that, to improve readability,
the sign be all graphic and the pictorial be eliminated.
21.

Mr. Bell decided to keep the pictorial but agreed

with Mr. Brossart's recomrendation to increase the size of the
graphic be extending the width of the sign and, thereby,
increase the size of the letters and, at the same time, keep the
letters proportional to the pictorial.

Mr. Bell specifically

requested that the graphics and pictorial be proportionate.
22.

The sign was thereafter constructed and a

completion package was sent by Plaintiff to the defendant.

The

advertisement was hung on the billboard on February 15, 1989.
23.

The completion package did not indicate how far

the sign was from the various lanes of highway.

That

information was not specifically requested by Defendant of (sic)
Plaintiff and the information, though in the files of Plaintiff,
was not readily available to Mr. Brossart.

24.

The defendant, thereafter, asked as

representative of Kino Springs to drive by the sign for its
approval.
25.

The defendant was advised by Kino Springs that

the sign was not visible from the highway and that it did not
approve of the sign.
26.

On or about March 1, 1989, the defendant advised

Steve Brossart of Plaintiff that the client, Kino Springs, was
not happy with the sign and asked for the possibility of having
the sign re-painted to show all graphics.

Mr. Brossart advised

that it would be acceptable if the client would bear the cost of
re-painting.
27.

The contract entered into between Plaintiff and

Defendant specifically indicated that in the event re-paintir.g
was necessary, that the defendant and not the plaintiff would be
responsible for the expense of the re-painting.
28.

The defendant later contacted the plaintiff and

indicated that the defendant felt that the plaintiff should bear
the cost of re-painting.

The plaintiff declined to re-paint the

sign at its own expense.
29.

Cancellation of the sign was later discussed.

Plaintiff agreed to attempt to obtain new advertising for the
space but indicated that the defendant must pay for the space
until it was resold.
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30.

The parties also had a discussion with respect to

relocating the sign to Kino Springs as a form of settlement.
31.

None of the settlement negotiations resulted in a

resolution of the matter and no settlement agreement was
obtained.
32.

After the sign was in place, Steve Brossart, of

Plaintiff/ drove by the sign and, in his opinion, the graphics
were not readily seen but the pictorial could be seen.
33.

After the sign was in place, Larry Pinnock, a

representative of Defendant, drove by the sign three times and
could not see the sign on his drive-bys.

On his last drive-by,

he took a number of measurements with respect to the distance of
the sign from the highway.

Those measurements, which are

undisputed, show that the sign was approximately 200 yards from
the point of optimal visibility in the oncoming lane of traffic
on 1-19.
34.

The defendant admits that there were no defects

in the reproduction of the display, that it was prepared
pursuant to the instructions of the defendant and that the sign
was maintained for the full twelve month contract.
Additionally, the defendant was regularly invoiced for each
month of the contract.

The defendant failed and refused to make

any payment therefore.
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35.

The parties stipulated that the principal amount

unpaid under the terms of the contract is the sum of $8,323. 20,
plus interest at 1 1/2% per month on all unpaid balances.
36.

The parties reserved, pending the final decision

of this matter, the issue of attorney's fees*

The contract does

provide for an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
37.

The parties stipulated that the damages claimed

would not exceed the jurisdictional limits of this Court.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now
makes and enters its :

CONCLUSIONS QF LAW
1.

The Court finds that the defendant failed to pay

the contract amount based upon its expectation that the
plaintiff would provide a sign location which would be
effective.

The Court finds that there is nothing in the

contract which requires the plaintiff to meet this expectation
of Defendant.

Rather, the plaintiff's contractual duty was to

faithfully reproduce the sign from the artwork provided to it by
defendant.
2.

The defendant has defended against Plaintiff's

claim on the fcasis that there was no failure of consideration.
The Court finds that there was no such failure of consideration
because such a finding requires a finding that the party making
the claim be without fault.

The Court specifically finds and
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concludes that the defendant was negligent by not viewing the
sign location itself prior to the completion of the contract.
3.

The Court finds that although there may have been

unequal consideration in this contract that the disparity in
consideration was not unconscionable and, therefore, does not
find a failure of consideration by reason of unconscionability
in the disparity of consideration.
4.

The defendant has claimed that it had a right to

reject the contract and that it exercised that right.

The

defendant bases its defense upon paragraph 10 of the second page
of the contract.

The Court agrees that defendant's concern with

regard to readability and the*effectiveness of the sign was
communicated to the plaintiff within a reasonable time.
issue, therefore, is:

The

Can paragraph 10 of the contract be

reasonably interpreted to give the defendant a right to total
rejection upon dissatisfaction with the final product?

The

Court finds that such a reading cannot be given to the contract
for the reason that paragraph 10 of the contract does not go
that far and dees not support Defendant' s claim of right to
rejection of the entire contract,
5.

The defendant has defended against Plaintiff's

claim on the basis of mutual mistake.

The Court finds that

mutual mistake may not be maintained if the mistake claimed was
a risk which was assumed by the parties.
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The Court finds that

the risk of the effectiveness of the sign was a risk assumed by
the defendant and, therefore, the contract is not voidable by
reason of mutual mistake.
6.

Additionally, the Court finds that mutual mistake

is not a viable defense if the mistake concerns a prediction or
judgment.

The Court finds that the effectiveness of the sign

was a prediction or judgment made by the defendant despite the
advise by Steve Brossart that the sign should be changed to all
graphic to be readable.
7.

The Court concludes that Plaintiff is entitled to

judgment in the sum of 58,323.20 principal amounts, together
with interest on the unpaid balances at 1 1/2% per month, plus
Plaintiff's reasonable attorney's fees and costs.

The judgment

shall not, by stipulation of the parties, exceed the
jurisdictional limit of the Court.
8.

Judgment should be rendered accordingly.
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2810 W. Camelback Rd.. Phoenix, AZ 85017 (602) 246-9589

^
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PAINTED BULLETIN AGREEMENT

Ca- ~((j><2&

BRDCE B^j^ft-RgSOCK^Ea^

<*<M*tt*r) (Agency) hereb

contracts withptrfDOOR SYSTEMS (Outdoor) for the^eiqting and maintenance (Service) of the outdoor advertising display a
described bpfow upon the terms and conditions set forth Iruhle contract for a period of __12—f t w e l v e )
montns

commencing

nftflft.mhpr 2fi„, 1988—(uprtn romp 1 fit-Inn) __
D.E.C.

LOCATION

Tuv&vu

13*Q

ILL.

Nu

—
COPY SIZE

COST PER MONTr

1 0 ' A 4 0 ' i flOO.Oi}

East Line-North Face
Less 15% Agencj
Board #03-1022

tfL-\\o.&
KINO SPRINGS

Advertiser

Special Instructions
£,iitf*fc«vri Fv*brio«jLt»on j n d tainting It a one-time charge of $ J J L j Q i L
foot mon^'y maintenance charge.

per square fnnt pin* $ _ u / r i

paract

Copy and/or sketches tor initial painting shall be delivered to Outdoor on or before fifteen daye prior to the commanceman
date of this contract. Failure to deliver copy shall not defer liability hereunder effective on the commencement date,
in t i . ' «.*nt of default m the payments under this contract, Outdoor may declare the contraot terminated and the unpaid
balance of the total contract amount immediately due and payable.
This contract consists of this page and the terms and conditions set forth on the back hereof, and is subject t , ic* apj: • ai c
the general m3rv><: v of Outdoor.
S*i»«jrnan: _ j J L c e v e n

R

*

Brossart

Bruce B e l l ft Afifann-fatru
ix&£&&&$ (Agency)

Approved: O U T D O O R SYSTEMS

JZL

_

Date

General\Manager
Address.

(Title)
48 P o s t O f f i c e

Place

Salt Lake City, Utah

Suite
200
84101

PAINTED BULLETIN AGREEMENT
TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1.

In the event any of the display locations become lost during the term hereof, or it is impossible to secure any specifi
location, or should any display become obstructed, destroyed or defaced, in whole or in part, because of any act or thi
beyond OUTDOOR's control, or should OUTDOOR desire to move or change any location, any resulting toss of advertisi
space shall not be deemed a breach or termination of this Agreement. Lost locations shall be replaced with locations
equal value in according with OUTDOOR's prices and classifications. Any resulting loss of advertising service shall
restored by extending the term of this Agreement to provide an equivalent amount of advertising service. Anything her<
contained to the contrary notwithstanding, OUTDOOR shall also have the option to terminate this Agreement upon t
loss of any location resulting from any act or cause beyond OUTDOOR's control, including any change in law. ordinam
rule or regulation.

2.

Invoices will be based on the commencement date hereof, and will be prorated to the end of the month so that thereat"
all invoices will be on a first of the month basis. Invoices are due and payable upon receipt and all terms are net cat
Invoices not paid within thirty (30) days after the invoice date are delinquent and accrue a delinquency charge of 1 Vi % p
month thereafter unless otherwise agreed upon.

3

OUTDOOR agrees that all designs for displays will be faithfully reproduced and that the displays will be maintained
good condition. OUTDOOR shall provide initial painting free of charge. Any repainting desired by (Advertiser) (Agency)
addition to that provided for herein shall be paid in accordance with OUTDOOR's current quoted prices. No credit shall
given for repainting not utilized.

4.

OUTDOOR reserves the right to reject any copy, pictorial or otherwise, which it deems unacceptable, for any reason.

5.

(Advertiser) (Agency), jointly and severally, agree to indemnify and hold harmless OUTDOOR from and against any and c
loss, liability, claifns, demands, costs and expenses (including attorney's fees), arising out of any copy displayed pursua
to this contract.

6.

Illuminated displays shall be illuminated from
to
In the event illumination is halted or reduced by reason of any law, ordinance or regulation, OUTDOOR will render a crec
for the period of non-illumination or reduced illumination at'the rate of
% of the contract price for the period \
non-illumination. A credit for reduced illumination will be prorated on the basis of the credit for non-illumination.

7.

OUTDOOR shall not be responsible for delays or loss of SERVICE by reason of strikes, lock outs, acts of Go<
governmental actions, or any other act or thing beyond its control.

8

It this Agreement is executed by an Agency, Agency warrants and represents that it is authorized to execute the same c
behalf of the Advertiser named on the face hereof and that Agency and Advertiser are jointly and severally liable for th
payment of all amounts due hereunder.

9

If this Agreement is executed by an Agency. Agency agrees to forfeit any commission it may be due from OUTDOOR, if th
billing for SERVICE is not paid within sixty (60) days from the date of such billing.

10 (Advertiser) (Agency) shall inspect the display within
days after installation. Unless within such penoc
(Advertiser) (Agency) gives written notice to OUTDOOR specifying any defect, the display shall be conclusively presume
to have been inspected and approved for all purposes whatsoever by (Advertiser) (Agency).
11 The display is and shall at all times remain the sole property of OUTDOOR and (Advertiser) (Agency) shall have no righ
title or interest therein, except as may be set forth in this Agreement.
12. No delay in or omission to exercise any right, power or remedy accruing to OUTDOOR on any breach or default b1
(Advertiser) (Agency), shall impair such right, power or remedy or be construed to be a waiver of any such breach or defaul
or acquiescence therein. A waiver of a single breach or default shall not be deemed a waiver of any other breach or default
No waiver shall be effective unless set forth in writing.
13. In the event that OUTDOOR shall incur any costs or fees (including reasonable attorney's fees), in enforcing its right:
hereunder, (Advertiser) (Agency) shall pay the same upon demand.
14. This Agreement sets forth the entire understanding of the parties and may not be amended or modified, except in writmc
signed by all parties.
15 Thiq Anreemont <5hall be bindina uDon and inure to the benefit of the respective heirs, personal representatives

WITNESS:

I'm sure I called Bruce to see if he received

my package, to see if he had any questions or concerns.
MR, VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

You spoke with Mr. Bruce Bell?

And what was said by whom?

He indicated to me that the sign had been

approved and that they were going to contract for the sign for a
year.
MR. VAN DYKE:

Did he elaborate on when he said the

sign had been approved, what that means?
WITNESS:

He indicated to me that someone that he

worked with in Nogales or his client had ridden the board and
approved the location.
MR. VAN DYKE:

Now when you ridden the board, what does

that mean?
WITNESS:

That means drove down the street and looked

at the board that was proposed.
MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

He didn' t — I don' t recall the name.

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Did he say who his client was?

What did he say?

He just said that—you know, someone at Kino

Springs.
MR. VAN DYKE:

Oh, I see.

mean the client?
WITNESS:

Correct.
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And you understood that to

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay, what else did he say if anything?

WITNESS: That he would sign it and he' d fax me back a
executed copy of the contract and that soon following would be
the art work.
MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

Did he say anything else at that

point about what type of art work he wanted?
WITNESS:

No.

MR. VAN DYKE:

I might represent to the Court that we

do have the original fax that came back signed—the parties have
stipulated that this is signed.

Okay.

What next happened?

First of all, was there anything else in connection with that
packet that happened or did that—would that packet have been
completed at that point?
WITNESS:

That was completed basically.

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Okay.

What next happened?

Bruce sent down some art work for me.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

What form was that?

Did he send

just a letter, did he call ya, what happened?
WITNESS:

Well, he called me and told me that that soon

following would be the art work.
MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Did he describe the type of art work?

No, he did not.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

Then was the next thing that

happened you received the —
WITNESS:

I received the art work.
-14-

MR. VAN DYKE:

Did it come in a big packet — w e don' t

have that.
WITNESS:

Okay.

It's just a—it's a big--I think it

was about this long, may be two feet, and it showed what the
art work on the inside of the package what they wanted.

It was

mailed to us, mailed to me.
MR. VAN DYKE:

Was it like a photograph, was it a

drawing?
WITNESS:

It' s a drawing and a photograph.

Scaled out

to the size of the board.
MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Was it one sheet, more than one sheet?

I believe it was like, the art work usually

comes with the picture of the board and then an overlay with
colors depicting what they want on the board.

So when you bring

it down, you know, you lift it up, there' s what it is, and then
you bring it down and it shows the pictures and the colors.
MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

So this was all provided to you.

Yes, it was.

MR. VAN DYKE:

On that art work that came down, just

print the pictures if you would, maybe that would help the court,
you look at Dl, you see, I think that' s the big picture in front
of you.

Is that it?
WITNESS:

It doesn't say Dl.

MR. OLSON :
MR. VAN DYKE:

It's on the backside.
OK, that' s Dl.
-15-

Now that' s the board

concluding that Outdoor Systems was not in breach of paragraph
10.
IV.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT ASSUMPTION
OF RISK NEGATES A DEFENSE OF MUTUAL MISTAKE.
The trial court further erred in holding that "mutual

mistake may not be maintained if the mistake claimed was a risk
which was assumed by the parties"

and that "the risk of the

effectiveness of the sign was a risk assumed by the defendant
and, therefore, the contract is not voidable by reason of mutual
mistake. "

(Conclusion No. 9. )
The governing authorities make no mention of assumption

of risk in connection with the law of mutual mistake.

Rather,

this Court has held that "a mutual mistake occurs when both
parties, at the time of contracting, share a misconception about
a basic assumption or vital fact upon which they based their
bargain. "

Robert Lanaston. Ltd. v. McOuarrie. 741 P. 2d 554, 557

(Utah Ct. App. 1987) (citation omitted).

"Mutual mistake of fact

makes a contract voidable, and is a basis for equitable
recision. "

££. (citations omitted).

The key inquiry is whether

there was a misconception, not whether some risk was assumed.
The evidence in this case, giving all reasonable doubt
to Outdoor Systems, shows that both parties to the Advertising
Agreement proceeded initially under the assumption that the
Outdoor Systems board could effectively carry an adequate
advertising message, without material limitation on the form or
-18g \wpl\l98\00000qgn.W51

content of the ad.
agreement.

This assumption was at the heart of the

Bell needed effective advertisement and Outdoor

Systems could not stay in business long selling space that did
not advertise.

However, in the course of performance it became

apparent that there were significant limitations to the board' s
capabilities.

This was first recognized to some degree by

Outdoor Systems in January, 1989.

Later,

once the billboard was

in place, both parties fully recognized the board' s deficiencies.
A mutual mistake of fact occurred.
The trial court erred in concluding that assumption

of

the risk negates defense of mutual mistake and that Bell assumed
the risk of the effectiveness of the* sign.

The facts as found by

the trial court do not support this conclusion.

Bell did assume

the risk that the design of the advertisement might not be
effective in drawing travelers to Kino Springs.

However, that

risk was founded on the reasonable assumption that the design on
the billboard would at least be visible to travelers.

It was

not.
Once again, the trial court apportioned fault to Bell
for failing to discover the great distance of the sign from the
road.

However, as already noted,

M

a mistaken party's fault in

failing to know or discover the facts before making the contract
does not bar him from avoidance or reformation . . . unless his
fault amounts to a failure to act in good faith and in accordance

-19-

traveling southbound on Interstate 19 to the location of Kino
Springs.

Is that correct?
WITNESS:
MR. OLSON:

I would imagine so, yes, sir.
That was indeed your testimony, was it not?

On direct?
WITNESS:

Yea, they were wanting to get people to

Nogales, to Kino Springs, to play golf, I would imagine.
MR. OLSON:

You indicated that Mr. Bell represented to

you that somebody from Kino Springs was actually intending to go
by and look at the sign location.
WITNESS:
MR. OLSON:

Is that correct?

Correct.
You called this a "ride the board ?•'

Was

that the term?
WITNESS:
MR. OLSON:

Uh-huh.

Ride the location.

Now when Mr. B*ell called you, did he tell

you where he was calling from?
WITNESS:
MR. OLSON:

Yea, he told me he was from Salt Lake City.
And Mr. Bell never indicated to you prior

to the time that the sign was put in place that he personally had
passed by the sign and had evaluated the location.
WITNESS:
MR. OLSON:

No, he had not.
And he never indicated to you that the

person he had directed to go by the sign and evaluate the
location had any particular expertise such as you have in
evaluating the suitability of that sign for advertising space,
-48-

did he?
WITNESS:

No.

MR. OLSON:

When you look at Exhibit D3A, its the

proposal,
WITNESS:

Yes, sir.

MR. OLSON:

Now, in looking at that proposal, this is

the document you testified you sent to Mr. Bell after that
conversation.

Is that correct?

WITNESS:
MR. OLSON:
correctly.

Correct.
Part of a packet, if I understand

Is that right?
WITNESS:
MR. OLSON:

Right.
Do you see anywhere on that proposal where

it discloses the distance of the sign from the highway.
WITNESS:
MR. OLSON:

No, it does not.
Would you look at Exhibit D3B, which is the

two photographs and the dimensional information.
WITNESS:
MR. OLSON:

Yes, sir.
Is there any place on that document other

than one might discern from the photograph where it is disclosed
that this is from the sign over to the highway.
WITNESS:
MR. OLSON:

No.
This is a north facing sign.

correct?
WITNESS:

Correct.
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Is that

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Okay,

So it was either here or nowhere,

That' s right.

We' d have gladly paid more

money to be on the other side of the road.
MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

So that was a conscious decision

you made, it would be a cross-reader.
WITNESS:

Yes, we knew that.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

And you knew that the street was

going straight, there wasn' t a bend.
WITNESS:

We knew that.

MR. VAN DYKE:

And so you knew there would be less

visibility than what would be desired.
WITNESS:

Urn, I can' t respond to that.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Well, you knew it wasn' t as desirable as

having a billboard on the same side of the street.
WITNESS:

Yes, I knew that.

MR. VAN DYKE:

And the reason it wasn' t as desirable is

because it' s harder to see.
WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Cross-readers are harder to see.
Okay.

We knew that.

All right.

Now,

when you sent the artist, or gave your instructions to the
artist, did you give any specific directions to the artist with
respect to the graphics of the directional instructions?
WITNESS:

No.

The step that was taken there is she

prepared a mock-up which I approved and then she executed the
artwork.
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WITNESS:

That' s true.

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Is that an economic decision?

Yes it is.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

You would agree, wouldn' t you,

that the optimum scenario would be for you to actually view the
site before ordering a billboard.
WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

But to the extent that it costs

you too much to take the time to go down there, you don' t do it?
WITNESS:

That' s correct.

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

And you don' t send someone else.

No.

MR. VAN DYKE:

And that' s for the same reason, it costs

too much?
WITNESS:

Same reason.

MR. VAN DYKE:

And you testified that on those

occasions when you have a site out of state you do send the
client to drive by?
WITNESS:

Yes I do.

MR. VAN DYKE:

And you relied upon that client to the

extent that they verified that the board was there.
WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. VAN DYKE:

And you relied upon the client to the

extent that they would be satisfied to have their message
displayed on that board don' t you?
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WITNESS:

Yes I do.

MR. VAN DYKE:
client of Kino

Okay.

So at the point that you had your

Springs go past the board, you relied exclusively

upon their judgment that they would accept that board, didn't
you?
WITNESS:

Yes I did.

MR. VAN DYKE:

In fact if they would have told you at

that point that it' s a cross-reader, you' re never going to be
able to see it, you wouldn' t have ordered the board, would you?
WITNESS:

No I would not have.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Now when you had the client drive by the

board, you knew the concept, didn' t you?
WITNESS:

Urn

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

The concept of the billboard?

No I did not.

Until she drove by the

billboard I hadn' t signed a contract.
MR. VAN DYKE:
advertising.
you?

I'm asking for the concept of

You knew it was going to be a pictorial, didn' t

You did discuss that with the lady from Kino Springs?
WITNESS:

No I did not discuss that until after I

signed the contract.
MR. VAN DYKE:

Oh, I see.

She didn' t tell you right up

front that she wanted a pictorial.
WITNESS:

No.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Have you done any work for Kino
-113-

Springs

WITNESS:

It was before.

MR. VAN DYKE:

It was before.

Okay.

So at that, as I

understand it at that point, you had a proposed, did you have a
proposal at that time, you did didn' t you?
WITNESS:

Yes I did.

MR. VAN DYKE:

So you had a proposal, you knew the

location of the board, you had had the client already go by the
board, and you at least had those factors before you, you knew,
did you know at that point that the concept that you wanted to
convey?
WITNESS:

No.

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Had you already done the magazine?

Yes.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Well, you knew this was going to be

compatible.
WITNESS:

I suspected it would, but I mean, it, you

know, you can only go so
MR. VAN DYKE:

You basically knew you weren' t going to

do a cartoon.
WITNESS:

Right.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

And so you had that information

before you when you received the packet.
WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Did you read the contract?

Yes I did.
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MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Both sides?

Yes I did.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

Now you describe to me in all the

discussions you had with Steve Brossart

up until the time of the

signing of the contract.
WITNESS:

Pardon me, I don; t understand the question.

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

Had he described all the conversations.

I believe we have, yes.

MR. VAN DYKE:

You have.

Now, so, you told me before

you got the contract, you got the contract, you read it, you
signed it.

You did, didn' t you.
WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

Now as I understand it, the

reason you don' t believe you should pay for the sign that went up
is because you can' t read it very well.
WITNESS:

Is that right?

That' s correct.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

Is there anywhere in the contract

that says you' re going to have to be able to read it?
WITNESS:

I believe that it would be implied.

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

No.

MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

It's not in the contract.

And you didn't discuss that with Steve?

No I did not.

MR. VAN DYKE:

In fact, the contract itself says that

the artwork will be faithfully reproduced.
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That' s there, that' s

the obligation isn't it, of Outdoor Systems?
WITNESS:

Yes it is.

MR. VAN DYKE:

So when he gets to the artwork, their

obligation is to put up accurately what you give them.
WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. OLSON:

Your honor, I object to that question.

It

calls for a legal conclusion of the contract that is a matter of
law, and this witness is not qualified to testify on that.
JUDGE:

Overruled.

MR. VAN DYKE:

So as I read your Answer to the

Complaint, you believe there' s been a mistake, a mutual mistake.
Who made the mistake?
WITNESS:

Of what mistake are you talking?

I think Outdoor Systems and Bruce Bell &

Associates both made a mistake.
MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

What mistake?

The mistake is that they have constructed a

board which is very difficult to read.

It is a cross-reader.

If

it was a new piece of construction, no message has ever been on
there, it was very difficult for anyone to determine how well or
what kind of message would work on that board.
MR. VAN DYKE:

I find that curious.

You have 28 years

of experience in billboard advertising.
WITNESS:

Yes I do.

MR. VAN DYKE:

But you can' t look at a site and a board

and say whether or not you can put a message on that that would
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be read?
WITNESS:

No I cannot.

In some instances I can, but in

this instance I couldn' t.
MR. VAN DYKE:
WITNESS:

In this instance you couldn' t.

No.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Well, let's suppose that rather than

having a pictorial we had lettering, the full height and width of
the board.

Could that be seen?
WITNESS:

I would suggest it could.

MR, VAN DYKE:

So it could convey a message.

The

problem we' ve got is that it couldn' t convey a message with the
artwork you provided, is that right?
WITNESS:

That seems to be the case.

MR. VAN DYKE:

That is the case.

Now there were some

discussions, I think everybody agrees, between yourself and Steve
with respect to enlarging the graphics, is that right?
WITNESS:

Yes.

MR. VAN DYKE:

Okay.

Did you at that time have an

opinion as to whether or not the pictorial would even be visible?
WITNESS:

Urn, well, obviously I wouldn' t have sent him

a pictorial if I didn' t think it would work.

In a normal

situation I think I could count on a pictorial in a cross-reader
working.
MR. VAN DYKE:

It, ah, is it fair to say that you

wanted or that you approved the extension on the board?
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